[转帖]中国军力报告相关内容
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Task Force Roll-Out: Chinese Military Power
Speakers:
Harold Brown, Task Force Chair; Former U.S. Secretary of Defense
Joseph Prueher, Task Force Vice-Chair; Former Ambassador to China and Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command
Adam Segal, Task Force Director; Maurice R. Greenberg Senior Fellow, China Studies, Council on Foreign Relations The Washington Club, 15 Dupont Circle, N.W.
Thursday, May 22, 2003
Press Release | Report
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Adam Segal: The Council formed this Independent Task Force to provide pragmatic and nonpartisan approaches to measuring trends in Chinese military modernizations. The need for this approach to Chinese military modernization came from a sense of Council President Leslie Gelb that we were in danger of repeating in the current debate over China much of the wide swings between frequent alarmism and undue optimism that characterized the debate about the Soviet military balance during the Cold War. In response to those swings, the report issues a double warning: First, against overreaction to the comprehensive nature of the People’s Liberation Army and the modernization of the Chinese military. And second, against under-reaction to the relative backwardness of the People’s Liberation Army, especially compared to the U.S. and U.S. military forces in Asia. The task force began in February 2003. It was composed of over 60 members, all with a wide expertise in China -- Chinese security, U.S. security, and East Asian issues. We are fortunate to have a number of the task force members in attendance this morning, and the contribution they made was wide and important and I hope is adequately reflected in the report itself. The task force met 10 times, and we discussed all of the forces of the People’s Liberation Army, civil military relations, Chinese strategic thinking, as well as the military balance across the Taiwan Strait. We also had three separate subcommittees, which focused specifically on technological, economic and political issues that constrain and motivate Chinese military modernization. The report touches on three basic areas, which Dr. Brown and Admiral Prueher are going to discuss and I’ll just briefly introduce here. The first is the findings. Where China now and what is are the appropriate criteria for judging China’s likely evolution over the next 20 years? Second is an attempt to isolate the political, economic, and technological factors that influence and have an impact on Chinese military modernization. What are these political decisions that civilian leaders have to make that could have a deep impact on PLA modernization over the next 20 years? And finally, our recommendations: Key among them are a set of indicators that we recommend that the U.S. should monitor that will give us a sense of the pace of Chinese military modernization, and would allow us to gauge how rapidly China is developing limited power projection capabilities. As well as a set of indicators that would allow us to realize if China has shifted. If those objectives of developing a limited-power project capability have changed, and China has new objectives for modernization, what would we have to look for? That said, I think I’ll now turn over the program to Dr. Brown. Dr. Harold Brown: Thank you, Adam. Before I talk about the report, I want to thank Adam and praise him for the remarkable job he did in turning lengthy discussions, some disagreements, and the final - sort of - consensus into a very well-written and clear, and I think, very illuminating and long document. Our first conclusion was and is that the PRC, though it is modernizing the PLA, it is at least two decades behind the U.S. in military technology and capability. And if the U.S. stays on course, in terms of its military development and expenditures, the balance will continue to be decisively in the U.S. favor militarily - not only globally, but also in East Asia generally for 20 years or more. Though by 20 years from now, again given present trends, China is likely to be the most militarily capable of East Asian nations. If we look at the purposes of Chinese military capability, the report notes that if you try to rank them by some combination of importance and risk, as the PRC political leadership sees it, the first is internal security - maintaining internal security and control. Allied to that is the question of sovereignty, which brings up the Taiwan issue which is an extremely important focus of Chinese military development, although not the exclusive focus. Going down the list, you come to the ability to maintain a military posture vis-Ã -vis its bordering countries - India, Korea, Russia, Central Asia and Japan. And then you also have to look at the way they think about the U.S. Certainly maintaining a deterrent capability is important to the Chinese; they understand the theory and practice of nuclear deterrents. And finally, as China modernizes economically and becomes a major power, the Chinese leadership wants the military capability that goes with that and the prestige that accrues from being a significant military power. When we talk about continued military dominance in the United States there are some modifications or some reservations that one has to point out. On the mainland, the Chinese will continue to be a very, very strong force, but offshore, where aerospace and maritime and technical capability matters a lot, they will continue to be significantly inferior. Another reservation that one has to think about is that asymmetrical warfare, as much in the news, and Chinese military writings talk a lot about asymmetrical warfare. It is certainly true that when you talk about ballistic missile capability - and in the future, I would think cruise missile capability - that could pose an asymmetrical threat to Taiwan and to U.S. military forces, including carriers. On the other hand, we hear a great deal about cyber warfare - most of that is vaporware, but it is something that you need to think about. I think that, as the Chinese political leadership thinks about possibilities of military conflict, the adverse effect of a conflict, for example, over Taiwan with respect to all the parties and whatever the outcome, argues for us - and I think probably for the Chinese as well - to work a political and military and diplomatic strategy to avoid the worst outcomes. And we in the U.S., as I read our own report, should act so as to reassure the Chinese and the Taiwanese - but of different things - we should reassure each that we will do our best to prevent what it sees as the nightmare outcome. In the case of China, it is a Taiwan that moves toward independence with the support and protection of the United States. And for the Taiwanese, it is a Chinese action to incorporate Taiwan unwillingly into China with the U.S. not taking any action to prevent that. I said something about the nuclear balance that the Chinese intend to preserve deterrence. And I believe that the Chinese will do whatever they have to do to try to retain deterrence, despite what the U.S. may do in the way of ballistic missile defense or cruise missile defense or whatever kind of defense. And, although this is a personal judgment, I think that China’s economic and technological capability over the next couple of decades will enable them to do that if they give it high enough priority. Adam spoke of the subgroups that worked on the task force. We did look at political issues. It is our judgment that the PRC political leadership intends to concentrate on domestic economic growth as well as maintaining the political control of the Communist party and that a peaceful environment will be important to them but the complications of the secession process suggests a degree of continuity in their military strategy. And I think the U.S. can influence Chinese political and military development only at the margin, although that’s worth doing. Economically China has experienced -- and probably will for some time -- experienced rapid economic growth. There will be glitches occasionally from things like SARS. At the same time there are substantial internal problems of balance, which everybody knows about - geographical, rural versus urban, the development of class distinctions and so forth. And those, I think, could cause significant problems and make, in my judgment at least, the prospect of 7% or 8% real growth over a period of another 20 years rather questionable. But that said, China’s economic capability would continue to grow. And military spending has shown quite rapid growth in the PRC through the 1990s. A dollar figure for the Chinese military budget is probably not very meaningful - the economies are so different between the U.S. and China. But if you try to think of whose expenditures it is rather like, I think somewhere in the range of Russia, the UK and Japanese spending is about right. What’s more important in trying to judge the military evolution in China is knowing the share and the trend of human resources, financial resources, and technical resources that the Chinese are devoting to military capability. And, unfortunately, our intelligence community hasn’t done very well in deciding either what the level is or what the trends are. It’s important to know that, however, because that share and that trend says more about Chinese military future capabilities and Chinese intentions - strategic goals - than any dollar figure says. And it is important to recognize that in determining what share the military gets, there are lots of competing needs in China. Not only current economic needs, but the needs for establishing a social welfare net, which has shrunk as China has moved more toward a market economy and also medical care is clearly going to be important there, recapitalizing the banks is going to be important and so forth. There are competing needs -- the Chinese presumably will decide what share of resources the military gets. In technical terms, it is clear that China is quite advanced in commercial technology and, indeed, is likely to become the world’s shop floor for medium technology and even some advanced technology products. But the translation to that to military systems is no easy matter. Both Japan and the UK are very advanced technologically, more so than China, but neither of them have found it easy. In fact, neither of them has succeeded. The Japanese haven’t tried very hard, but occasionally they do, in translating that into the system of systems that constitutes modern advanced military capability, and so it will take time for the Chinese to make that translation. I actually took the United States - well, we started that process 40 years ago and we’ve achieved it. The U.S. Army redid itself following the Vietnam War, but it took 10 or 15 years. And it involves more than knowing the technology and, in fact, more than the military hardware that that technology has to be turned into. It involves training, it involves tactics, and it involves military structure and organization. And the Chinese have a long way to go in that regard. Moreover, the capabilities of their commercial systems are determined largely by a relatively free market oriented infrastructure - that’s not the case with respect to a military production. That’s part of the state-owned enterprise system in China, which is quite a different kettle of fish, much less efficient and much less effective. I guess the most obvious demonstration of this is the fact that when it comes to advanced aircraft China doesn’t make those. It does some assembly, but by and large, it buys them from Russia. That helps them but it suggests that they’re not yet ready to stand on their own feet. And it is one reason why we recommend a continuation of the denial of arms and military technology transfers to China. There are other recommendations that Joe Prueher will bring out, talking about future indicators of Chinese capability and in talking also about some possible military scenarios, we have a few that I’d like to mention. Recognizing that we might still end up as adversaries in a strategic sense of the Chinese, and that’s mostly up to Chinese domestic evolution and to some extent to the U.S. domestic evolution. We should not have it recur as a result of misreading. Some people think that the Cold War was a misunderstanding; I don’t think so at all, but I don’t want to have a Cold War with China develop as a result of a misunderstanding. And as part of that transparency in military matters is important and military-to-military discussions are important, recognizing, however, that it’s the political leadership that determines. And we should not in our military’s interactions with the PLA take PLA aspirations to represent PRC political leadership intentions; they’re not the same thing. But it would be useful to talk about things like nuclear strategy and to have a Track Two - that is a combination of private and informal governmental context on crisis management, for example. Those are some of the things that we’re recommending. I’ll turn it over to Admiral Prueher. Admiral Joseph W. Prueher: Thank you, Hal. I want to thank all of you for coming out this morning. It’s a treat to be here with you. I would like say that Dr. Brown has sort of captured the center of our conclusions, and I’d like to fill in a couple of bits of context and some other points as well. First, the participants in this study were a remarkable group of people with a lot of disparate backgrounds. However, I would say one of the things we had in common, or several of the things we had in common, is people were U.S. patriots. They were people who think the U.S.-China relationship makes a lot of difference and have spent - a lot of them - a substantial amount of their lives studying it. They also bring a lot of intellectual candlepower to the effort. And our effort in the study that was chartered by the Council on Foreign Relations was not to result in a sales pitch on Chinese military power and what we think it is. But rather to have as an objective study as we could and deal with uncertainty by trying to bracket the range of uncertainty and then give our opinion and the rationale for what was there. We tried to deal with facts, not necessarily perceptions, but remaining aware throughout that in the U.S.-China relationship that perceptions count a lot and how we act with each other. The report is, I think -- and I think most of us agree -- a very balanced report. Adam talked about one of the conclusions is it’s important neither to under-react nor over-react. And the Goldilocks principle of getting it just right in dealing with China, whether we can or not will be the challenge as we go forth. And the last general point is that, in looking at the U.S. and China, we obviously do not act in a vacuum in dealing with each other. We act in a world where a lot of other things are going on -- 9/11, North Korea, the other Asian nations, the world economies and our own domestic politics all impact our interrelationships with each other. And with that said, let amplify a little bit on the findings and get into a little more detail than Hal did in his presentation on a couple of them. One of these is that China is, as has been pointed out, is a have-nation now; they are not a have-not nation anymore. Albeit with the challenges, which have been outlined, they are pursuing military modernization but it is not the highest priority for China but it is a priority. Another conclusion on defense spending and to amplify a little bit -- we don’t know what the defense spending of China is. Probably as good a person on that subject as there is around is David Shambaugh who has studied it a lot and then others amplifying that. The official figure of about $22.4 billion in the last year is a 9.6% increase, which is the smallest increase over the last 13 years - okay, those are just data. We think that the actual defense expenditure may be two or three times, i.e., $44 billion or perhaps $66 billion that China has spent on defense. We don’t know for sure. We think probably the official estimate of $22.4 billion is the low end; the high end is probably not our $66 billion, but the DoD report has a 80-plus billion that they have said that China spends on defense. That could be right but we think it is more likely - and the report has the rationale for this - is the 44 to 66 billion range. And Dr. Brown pointed out -- Russia at 65, Japan at 43, the UK at 38 billion are points of reference. And those figures are fairly good. All those are in U.S. dollars. The other warning that goes with that is defense expenditures, when one looks at military capability - if one looks at our defense budget, which is in the high $300 billions, a large percentage goes to personnel cost, BRAC, pensions, a lot of things that do not directly affect military capability. Likewise, if you look at defense expenditure in another country, counting hardware is not the way to look at military capability. You must look at the hardware, you must look at training, you must look at combat, logistic support, and these are things that the Chinese were taking on. The competition for funds in China, I think, has been well covered. Let me talk momentarily about a couple of scenarios. The foremost of which is the mainland-Taiwan scenario, which though it is not foremost a military issue, often gets looked at in the military light because that’s the easiest way to look at it to do military comparisons. It also has become sort of a proxy in a lot of circles for the U.S.-China relationship and it is a scenario, which can precipitate a crisis in one hell of a hurry. Things can go wrong in that relationship that can bring the U.S. and China into competition or conflict in a way that is more open and overt than almost anything else, as witnessed the ’95-’96 - I call it the Taiwan Missile Crisis. But that event occurred and it brought things to a head in a hurry, and this yields some of our other conclusions. The issue is not one in the China-Taiwan aspect as you extrapolate to the U.S.-China mil-to-mil relationship. It is not necessarily one of overall military power between China and the United States, but it is one of response time, owing to the very close proximity of the mainland and Taiwan and the ability for very quick actions to be taken, either by Taiwan or by China. And then the United States, if we are to participate in an outcome, requires a very quick response time on our part. The significance, of course, one of the significance of Taiwan is it - for the Chinese is an issue of sovereignty and for the United States has become an issue of our commitment to Asia and our commitment in the region. So it says very important to us and it’s very fragile. The idea of peaceful resolution is a good one. It is one that needs further discussion in our country and in China. The problems of talking about the military solution is that if you focus on the military solution, that isn’t a solution to the Chinese-Taiwan issue; the solutions lie in the political and the economic domains, and perhaps a little bit in the cultural domain - not in the military one. But it could be a catalyst for military confrontation, therefore, it is important to look at what drives Chinese military expenditure, it drives some of our Chinese military expenditures or, at a minimum, drives the rhetoric associated with those expenditures. Another scenario, which is looming in the news right now, of course, is the issue of North Korea. The U.S., China, Japan, South Korea, and to the extent the Russian Far East - but Russia - all have the same general objective there, which is a stable non-nuclear Korean Peninsula. It’s in everyone’s interest to have that. How we get there is the tough part of it. What this scenario highlights is the change in China of China’s action as a responsible, major international actor that they have to advance beyond their philosophy of non-interference - they are a lynchpin in the solution of the North Korean situation. And how we interact with China will be very important. And it is one that we looked at in this study quite a bit. Again, the military power is a subset of the overall solution here, but an important one. Now let me shift and talk a little bit more about the conclusions and recommendations of the study. And, by the way, Adam, the body of the report is quite long - the Executive Summary and Conclusion and Recommendations are quite well-put and I hope will be useful to all of us. One conclusion is China is on a modernization trajectory. Dr. Brown outlined the drivers, which are also outlined in the report, what is pushing the Chinese military modernization or most of which is internal security. Then the notion of active peripheral defense is the part that brings the Chinese, the PLA, and the PLAN/PLAF [phonetic] into interaction with the U.S. and with other countries militaries. So this active peripheral defense connotes an increase in mobility on the part of the Chinese and an increase in technical improvement and an increase in combat logistics. One of the best reports of the report, I think, is the indicators to watch, the things as we go forward. We have a conclusion in our report now based on what we see today. An important question, as one deals with a fluid situation in politics or whatever, how long do you expect that answer to be true? What we have outlined in the report are the indicators to watch to indicate that the situation is changing. And as we look at Chinese military power - not economics, not politics - we think it is important to look at five things. One is the command control and communications and computer intelligence and surveillance capability, C4ISR. These sound familiar because there are things that we do. We tried not to mirror image, but we see a big advance in that area in China, that means we have to change some of our results here. Secondly, we need to look at their ability to operate jointly. Not just as we had early joint operations in our country of having different services operate in the same area at the same time, but really operate jointly where you are mutually supported like a real team. The third thing is precision strike - the ability for the Chinese military to precisely hit targets to be able to project military power over a distance. Dr. Brown talked about ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and then also, perhaps, their air power, their sea power and aerospace as well. Combat support, combat logistics. It is really one of the things that makes the United States military unique, in that our ability to sustain combat elsewhere. No other nations really have this capability, and China has it close to zero at this point. They look at the South China Sea; that’s an important area to export combat power over short distances is something we should look at. The fifth item to look at is the level of training, and this is one that they’re working on to bring a higher level of professionalism in the PLA and it’s an area that warrants watching. These five are indicators that are very useful as we go forward. Then the recommendations in the report - one is for increased military dialogue. For some here - this is a drum I happened to beat personally for a long time - but the idea of military dialogue is slightly different than the transparency or the openness issue, but it is a dialogue among senior military leaders in order to prevent miscalculation on the way ahead. Our military is certainly subservient to our civilian bosses, so policy decisions aren’t going to get made by the military. I would say they’re not going to get made by the military in China as much any more either, but this senior military dialogue continues to be important. Crisis Management -- The ability for the U.S. and China in a situation like the ’96 straits crisis, the erroneous bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, the collision between REP3 and the Chinese F8 off of Hainan Island. These crises that came up - our ability to rapidly communicate and handle these crises is important. The Chinese recognize this; we recognize this but it needs to progress. We recommend also a strategic dialogue that has to do with nuclear deterrence, that has to do with missile defense, that this would be a fruitful ground for bringing about an avoidance of unnecessary conflict between the U.S. and China and then the recommendation that the PLA and the PRC be more open. We use the term transparency; the Chinese are not particularly keen about that term, but openness about what our objectives are is one of our last recommendations. So with that, I think that concludes our overview and we open to questions. Adam Segal: We’ll open the floor to questions. If you could state your name and your affiliation, also please remember that is, of course, on-the-record. Question: I haven’t had a chance to read the report yet. I don’t know if you address this in the body, but I’d like to ask you to talk about the relationship between transformation for the U.S. military and how that might affect perceptions of Chinese military power in the Asia Pacific region? What I’m thinking about - so as not to be vague - is the possibility that for the first time the U.S. may be withdrawing troops from Asia or significantly reconfiguring them, rather than us being thrown out of the Philippines bases in the early ’90s. You see what’s going on in Korea - the possible spillover effect in Japan, plus the desire to redeploy our services elsewhere. If that happens, how is the Chinese military likely to react to that, could that somewhat overturn the fairly sanguine conclusions you had, which I happen to agree with about perceptions of the military balance right now and how might the rest of Asia react to that? Dr. Harold Brown: My own reaction to that - and Joe should say what he thinks, too - is that an action of this sort by the U.S., a re-basing action, would be done in the belief, on the U.S. side, that our military capabilities would not be impaired by that. The transformation is not just a geographical relocation - it’s a change in capabilities that allows you to make that geographical reallocation without decreasing and, in fact, possibly increasing your ability to project force. At the same time, of course, it reduces your political vulnerability in various ways. It introduces your vulnerability to public dissatisfaction in those countries where we’d move ground forces back or out, and it also reduces our vulnerability to the governments in those regions. In that sense, it may be seen as reducing our commitment. It makes our actions less automatic and that’s a political change, which I think might have a bigger effect on Chinese perceptions. It may cause them to believe that the U.S. is reducing its political commitments in the region. Now how will the Chinese military react to that, but more important, how will the Chinese political leadership react to it? They may see it as a reason to slow down their military efforts on the basis that they may feel less threatened. Or, on the other hand, they may see it as a political opportunity - and even a military opportunity - to increase their influence over their neighbors. That I think really depends more on internal developments in China. In the report we do mention that political turmoil in China is possible. And we are of two minds as to what the effect of that might be, whether it would make the Chinese less inclined to military adventures outside or more inclined to military adventures outside. Admiral Joseph W. Prueher: I can’t add a whole lot to that. One, our report - we had to constantly exercise ourselves to remember that our task was Chinese military power and evaluation of that, so I don’t think we addressed that particular issue, the impact of U.S. transformation to some extent. The allocation of U.S. forces in Asia, we didn’t really get at that in the report. The signal that that sends in Asia, of course, is one of which we have to take great care. In our experience, moving a couple of airplanes out of Japan, people notice -- has our commitment diminished to security in Asia - is obviously politically extremely important. If you go back to the early ’90s with the Nunn-Warner Act, the initiation of moving troops out of Korea -- I was about to say maelstrom but that’s a little bit of hyperbole - but the strong reaction that occurred from that is something that we need to take care not to create a vacuum in the perception in Asia. I think the transformation, the adjustment of our presence in Asia -- we need to try to do it with as few discontinuities. If we readjust for a good reason, it needs to be well-articulated and thought out and done in as smooth a way as possible so as not to create a vacuum or create a discontinuity and for all the reasons that Dr. Brown cited. Adam Segal: If I could just echo the last point that Dr. Brown made, which is the report spends a considerable amount of time discussing the drivers of Chinese military modernizations. And the task force struggled a great deal over what the U.S. military policy and the U.S. deployment and missile defense - these types of things, what type of effect they would have on the pace of Chinese military modernization. We talk about specific capacities, mainly in the context of missile defense, but also in precision strike and long range and how the Chinese are going to think about that. The report, as Dr. Brown said, is of two minds of these things. That essentially we see modernization as having internal drivers, but the U.S. has an impact on the margins. Question: Bill Jones from Executive Intelligence Review. The report mentions that there should be continued non-transfer of any military equipment to China. But below that level of the actual military equipment there’s a lot of high-tech trade that sometimes go on or maybe should go on or shouldn’t go on and could be of benefit in terms of the overall relationship. I’m thinking in particular that there was a proposal at one point when there was a lot of optimism in the ’90s over the Chinese relationship where there was a suggestion to bring a Chinese astronaut onto the international space center. And, of course, considerations of technology transfer led to the fact of not making that decision and the Chinese have gone to develop themselves and will probably get up there rather shortly. The question is, if you take the model of the Russia-U.S. cooperation, where do you draw the line in terms of trying to establish some sort of collaboration involving some of the high-tech areas, which may led to a seepage of some technology to the Chinese? But the overall project of which it’s involved would lead to an improvement of the relationship. Does the discussions leading up to the report take consideration to any of these and do you have any indication where you would actually draw the line? Do you want to keep all high-tech stuff out? Is that your criteria and forget the political indications or is there somewhere this can take place? Admiral Joseph Prueher: It’s not an easy question because civil technology aids, in fact, leads military technology. What we say is don’t transfer arms, don’t transfer specifically military technology. When you come to dual use you have to make a judgment. And in my view, that judgment is more often made on political than on technical and military grounds - whether that should be so is another question but it is so. For example, putting a Chinese astronaut in our space station is, in my judgment, not a contribution to Chinese military capability. When you come to super computers that’s a different matter because that does certainly have an effect on design capability. And when you think about that, you have to think what can the Chinese do...but that’s not a reason for us to sell them advanced fighter aircraft ourselves. And you do have to think about commercial relations and economic relations and you have to try and balance those. And, as I say, in that balance I suspect that political and diplomatic and strategic issues will play a larger part than either military or technical issues. Dr. Harold Brown: I’d like to make one minor add to that. I think obviously one reason the dual-use part doesn’t occur and we don’t know what the Chinese are up to. We don’t know what their objectives are; they’re not clear about that. Our relationship is not yet one based on mutual trust and shared values, hence our recommendations on strategic dialogue, military dialogue to build communications, to build an understanding. And then - I don’t mean to be too idealistic -- but then get some modicum of trust on what we’re about, needs to be a part of any decisions on technology transfer. And the dual-use issue, we all know is a very difficult decision to make on what is and what isn’t dual use these days. Question: Don [indiscernible - too far from microphone]. A year or so ago there was a great deal in the press and elsewhere in the United States about the contribution that a Chinese espionage allegedly made to technical military things in China - either nuclear [indiscernible] missiles. In assessing Chinese military power, did you look at this question to a degree which secrets sold from the United States - espionage, etc. - was a major factor or not a major factor or whether the developments in these fields was really indigenous or stolen? If the task force didn’t look at it, do you all have any opinions about that? Dr. Harold Brown: We did not look at that particular issue, Don, but it is clear that on some things the Chinese have gained a lot from outside, and I’ve given an example. They are learning quite a lot about advanced aircraft from the Russians and on other things it was indigenous. Their rocket development, I think, was largely indigenous, although they got about a boost from the Soviets early on before the breakdown of Sino-Soviet relations in the 1950s, but after that they did it themselves. The much-publicized alleged theft of nuclear secrets, it seems to me, was not very well explained in the press. In my own judgment, it was more like they found out that a Lincoln Continental automobile is 180-inches long and 60-inches high and has a 250 horsepower engine and now they know how to build one, for example. But the Chinese are doing everything they possibly can to gain industrial secrets in the United States everybody knows. And in the course of that, I’d be surprised if they weren’t picking up some military secrets as well. But I do not think that their improvements in military capability are primarily driven by espionage or even largely driven by that - significantly, maybe. Adam Segal: As Dr. Brown says, and the report reinforces, it’s clear that the Chinese are activity engaged in trying to get technology anyway they can - overtly, covertly. I think one of the findings of the report is that we believe that the acquisition of individual components should not be overstressed to the contribution to Chinese modernization. And if one piece of technology is taken, you have to look at the larger question - and this brings us back to these questions of systems integration and systems analysis and how the Chinese are able to integrate those individual components. The debate over the WAD8 [phonetic] or these things are kind of a larger question about how do we value an individual component as opposed to a larger system. Admiral Joseph Prueher: And it’s almost impossible to steal systems integration capability by espionage. Dr. Harold Brown: I think that’s 99% of the answer. A couple of points - industrial espionage, of course, is not unique to the U.S. or China; it’s something that goes on with most nations. The other part is in the attempts to deal with actual facts versus perceptions this issue gets tied up in that a lot of the perceptions of what goes on versus what we can actually demonstrate. Question: Regarding the [indiscernible] area, I was just wondering were you a [indiscernible] facilitator or encouraged by U.S. for the two sides of the Taiwan Strait to pursue the possibility in the future? And secondly, do you see any significant change or shift of the balance between the Taiwan Strait - the military balance? Thank you. Admiral Joseph W. Prueher: Could you amplify your first question on confidence-building measures? I didn’t quite understand. Question [repeated]: Yes, some experts in Washington are promoting the idea of confidence-building measures. Admiral Joseph W. Prueher: Between? Questioner: Between Taiwan and China. I wonder should the panel recommend the U.S. should play any role to facilitate or to encourage, thank you. Admiral Joseph W. Prueher: I will give you my opinion. We did not talk about confidence-building measures between the mainland and Taiwan in our study. My opinion is the United States . . . a lot of people would probably think those are good to go on, that they would be useful to have between the mainland and Taiwan. I think if the U.S. took too aggressive a role in supporting that it would be counterproductive in having it occur. You have to forgive my attention span - your second question . . . There is a lot of rhetoric associated with China and Taiwan. I think the one - if I could generalize from what the panel thought - is that for Taiwan to defend itself against China would be something that would be very difficult if China were to take a hostile aggressive action. So the idea, as we alluded to earlier about response time is important. I think we need to keep in mind the idea of a peaceful resolution. The balance between the mainland and China has to do a great deal with U.S. backing and support that Taiwan would not get run over by China. The points again that Dr. Brown, I think quite carefully made, against the messages that the U.S. sends to both sides of the straits are very important. They’re different messages, but they’re ones that try to promote stability toward a peaceful resolution rather than provocation of a military confrontation. And when you talk about the balance, I think you’re alluding to a military balance. I think the military balance will change a little bit, depending on a more modern system, an increased level of training, some increased capability, but it doesn’t impact the overall goal of a solution as much as the political and the economic balance. And I think it’s important to look at those balances as well as the military balance. Unidentified Male: Hostile action includes various kinds of things. It can be quite short of invasion and still be quite coercive and that’s where the issue of U.S. military involvement becomes quite important. The PRC can coerce Taiwan without invading and U.S. early participation would determine how coercive an action by China could be carried out. Adam Segal: One of the strong Council norms is actually finishing on time, so I’m afraid we’re going to have to close up now. I appreciate everyone’s coming and for your questions and thanks very much.
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