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For the New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics January 5, 2005
word count: 5398
“Socialism”
by
John E. Roemer1
In the Marxian theory of historical materialism, the ruling class in each mode of
production has its special method for extracting the economic surplus from the direct
producers; that method follows from the characteristic property relations under the mode.
Under the slave mode, the surplus produced by slaves is forcibly appropriated by the
slave owner; under feudalism, the lord extracts surplus serf labor through the corvée and
various forms of taxation. Capitalism, Marx argued, was the first mode in which
surplus extraction was not obviously coercive: no capitalist owns his workers or forcibly
takes their product. Indeed, under capitalism, workers and capitalists form contracts in
which labor power is exchanged for a wage. The capitalist keeps the product of the
worker’s labor.
Indeed, Marx wished to explain capitalist surplus extraction as a process that
would emerge under competitive contracting, in which workers and capitalists bargain
and, in the end, competitive markets set the terms of labor exchange. (As Makowski and
Ostroy have written, prices are what appear after the dust of the competitive brawl has
cleared. It is incorrect to think of prices as directing trade; rather, bargaining among
many pairs of individuals reaches an equilibrium summarized by a price.)
Why is it that capitalists end up getting the better part of the deal – that is, they
end up with the surplus, and the worker ends up with his wage, which in the Marxian
view was only enough for him to subsist upon? The answer lies not in the fact that the
capitalist is more clever or has the police on his side: it is that capital is scarce relative to
the available supply of labor, and workers must bid for the right to use that scarce capital,
which provides them with a wage. Were labor scarce, then capital would have to bid for
labor, and profits would be bid down to a minimal level, at which capitalists were
indifferent between continuing to own capital and becoming workers. Why capitalism
seems to have been characterized, throughout its history, as a situation of capital scarcity
is not fully understood. Marx argued that capitalists as a class, perhaps represented by
1 Yale University.
2
the state, undertook strategies to guarantee a ‘reserve army of the unemployed,’ in order
to maintain the imbalance. Indeed, the proletarianization of the agricultural periphery is
an important process by which labor abundance has been maintained until the present
(see Rosa Luxemburg). Keynes and Schumpeter envisaged a time when capital would
cease to be scarce, bringing about the euthanasia of the capitalist class.
Thus, the fundamental source of the accumulation of wealth in the hands of a
small class, through profits created in production, is that abundant workers must bid for
the ‘privilege’ of using their labor power on privately owned productive assets that
increase its productivity immensely. This provides them with a wage greater than they
could have earned in the non-capitalist sector (back on the family farm, so to speak, or
selling apples from a street cart), and also produces an additional amount that, according
to the labor-capitalist bargain, belongs to the capitalist. Capitalists consume a part of this
surplus product, and invest the rest in other profit-making activities.
Some writers have argued that capitalism is a system that extracts the surplus
from workers coercively; they point to the struggles between workers and bosses at the
point of production. It is, I believe, important to point out that capitalist accumulation
could transpire, in principle, if capitalists were competitive, and if coercion at the point of
production of the worker by the capitalist and his agents did not occur. That coercion,
upon which many have focused as a central evil of capitalism, only exists because labor
contracts are incomplete and not costlessly enforceable. Imagine that the worker and
capitalist could contract about every eventuality that might occur during production. If,
in addition, the contract were costlessly enforceable (imagine an omnipotent arbitrator
who is at hand to deal with any disagreement), then there would be no petty coercion at
the point of production: capitalists would not try to speed up assembly lines, force
workers to work overtime, cheat them of their wages, discipline them in demeaning ways,
and so on. I believe that Marx thought that the essence of capitalism was the
accumulation of capital even under such conditions. That actual capitalism is not
perfectly competitive, that contracts are incomplete, and that capitalists and workers will
haggle over who is to do what when a situation not described in the contract comes up, is
something which makes capitalism more unpleasant than the ideal type would be, but is
not of its essence.
3
Marx believed that the property relations of each mode of production would last
only so long as they succeeded in inducing production in an efficient way. “The water
mill gives us the feudal lord, the steam engine, the industrial capitalist.” He believed
that eventually productive forces would develop to such an extent that the capitalist mode
of extracting economic surplus would no longer be effective. Indeed, the next stage in
economic history, Marx conjectured, would be socialism, a period in which the means of
production were collectively owned and the economic surplus thereby became the
property of the workers.
We must define exploitation in the Marxian sense. Marx said that workers were
exploited because the labor required to produce the goods they could purchase with their
wages – including the labor needed to reproduce the capital stock used up in that
production – was smaller in quantity that the labor expended by workers for which they
received those wage goods. The ‘surplus’ labor, the difference between these two
quantities, became embodied in goods which, according to the contract, are owned by
capitalists, and which they sell for profit. Why does the worker put up with this
situation? Because he has no access to the means of production; the surplus labor he
supplies is, so to speak, the rent he pays the capitalist for access to those means.
Exploitation is defined as the fact that workers labor for more hours than are
‘embodied’ in the goods they receive as the real wage. Note that, although Marx insisted
the wage was one of subsistence, this is entirely unnecessary for the argument. All that
must be the case, for exploitation to exist, is that the hours of labor embodied in goods
which wages purchase are less than the hours worked by workers.
Marx viewed socialism as the system that would end capitalist exploitation, in this
sense. There are, however, at least prime facie, several ways of ending exploitation short
of collectivizing ownership in the means of production, and hence in collectivizing the
product they produce above what workers receive as wages. One is syndicalism, in
which groups of workers own their factories collectively; another is people’s capitalism,
a system in which firms are privately owned by citizens, each of whom owns a small
share of all firms. Syndicalism would quickly generate a system with highly unequal
ownership of productive assets, so some groups of workers would ‘exploit’ others
through trade, not to speak of hiring contract laborers. Designing a people’s capitalism
4
in which Marxian exploitation were eliminated is possible in the abstract, but it would be
difficult to implement in actuality. One should note that the distribution of shares in
firms to citizens that would abolish exploitation could not be an equal one. Consider the
situation of a person who does not work out of choice (a ‘surfer’), but collects dividends:
he would be exploiting others, in the Marxian sense, because the amount of labor
embodied in the goods he can purchase with his income is greater than the labor he
expends. Indeed, for exploitation to be abolished ( in the sense that the labor accounts
balance) those who choose not to work should receive zero shares of the capital stock.
It is in fact possible to design a system of share ownership so that, when individuals
choose their labor supply to maximize their preferences over labor and income, the
income they receive from wages and their dividends is precisely enough to purchase
goods embodying exactly the labor they expended, and in addition, the allocation of
labor and goods is Pareto efficient. This arrangement, called the proportional solution by
Joaquim Silvestre, solves an interesting intellectual problem, but it has little importance
as a way of solving the problem of capitalist exploitation, because of the difficulty of
actually computing the shares of firms citizens should receive, when information about
preferences is asymmetric. (The proportional solution, however, may be used by a small
community [for example of fisherman] who collectively own a resource [such as a lake]
and wish to exploit it efficiently, avoiding congestion and overuse.) Moreover, as we
shall see below, it is not necessarily ethically desirable if workers are significantly
heterogeneous in skill.
Socialism, then, became identified with collectivization of the means of
production. Workers would produce more goods than they consumed (nobody claims
that investment should be zero under socialism), but the existence of a surplus product
would not constitute exploitation because it would be owned by all. This presumably
meant that the state, which represented the working class, would decide upon its use.
Whether this would be the case because workers obtain the suffrage and vote in a party to
represent them, or because a party proclaiming itself to represent the working class takes
power by non-democratic means, is another question.
A terminological point is in order. Some advocates of socialism define it as a
system in which everyone reaches his full potential, racism and sexism vanish, and
5
citizens view each other as brothers. This is a mistake. To be true to the theory of
historical materialism, socialism should be defined as a nexus of property relations that
eliminates capitalist exploitation. Whether such a system possesses other nice
characteristics in consequence is a scientific question, one that cannot be settled by
definition.
A special word must be said about equality. If workers are highly heterogeneous
in skills, eliminating capitalist exploitation does not eliminate inequality in incomes.
Nevertheless, there has been a tradition of viewing socialism as a system of quite equal
incomes. This is partly due to the level of abstraction of Marx’s thinking, in which he
often viewed capitalism as characterized by a mass of homogeneous workers struggling
against a small elite of homogeneous capitalists. It is, however, also due to the belief that
many of the inequalities in workers’ skills come from unequal opportunities fostered by
capitalism, and were capitalism to be eliminated, workers would therefore become more
equal in skills. I believe this view of what socialist transformation, in the sense of Marx,
would accomplish is too optimistic – on which more below, when we return to the
conception of socialism as equality.
In the event, the world saw two major kinds of socialist experiment: one, initiated
by the Bolshevik revolution, was brought to power by a communist party which ruled
undemocratically, and shunned the use of markets, which, they feared, would bring with
them the old capitalist mentality, where traders tried to accumulate capital, and hence to
exploit others. The other was social democracy, in which parties representing workers
won state power through democratic means, and attempted to tax profits for the purpose
of investment and augmenting workers’ consumption (the so-called social wage). The
social democratic path did not as a principle abolish private ownership of capital assets,
although some firms were nationalized.
In principle, both of these techniques could abolish the kind of exploitation
associated with capitalism. If communist parties were perfect agents of their collective
principal, the working masses, they could set the rate of accumulation at that rate desired
by workers (there is a problem here of how to aggregate workers’ disparate preferences
over that rate), and then invest the surplus in that way which would best meet the
interests of workers (another preference aggregation problem). And under social
6
democracy, private capital could be taxed at a rate sufficiently high that, although rates of
exploitation would not be zero, they would be small. To keep capital from fleeing to
more profitable venues, under that situation, workers would have to be sufficiently skilled
so that, even under such a regime, capitalists’ profits would be sufficiently high. Thus,
guaranteeing highly skilled labor would appear to be a part of the social-democratic
formula if capital is freely mobile.
With regard to equalizing the distribution of income, both the Soviet-type
economies (the USSR and eastern Europe) and the Nordic social democracies did an
excellent job. (Indeed, at least in the Soviet Union, it is arguable that skilled workers
contributed more labor, in efficiency units, then they received back in goods.) The major
difference was that the Soviet economies equalized incomes at low levels, while the
social democracies did so at high levels. To what was due the failure of the Soviet
economies? We still do not have a completely satisfying explanation, but it seems as if
their abrogation of markets was an important factor.
Although the Soviet-type economies used markets from time to time , beginning
with Lenin’s introduction of the NEP in the 1920s, they were never allowed to operate
with the kind of freedom that would have fostered technological innovation, and by the
1960s, it was the lack of innovation that was largely responsible for the low level of
living standards. (Of course, when the state acted to concentrate talent in one sector, such
as the space industry, it was able to achieve impressive results, but the Soviet economy
never succeeded in fostering innovation across the board.) These problems were seen
much earlier, however, in the debate around market socialism that began in the 1930s,
with Oskar Lange’s argument that markets could in large part replace central planning in
a socialist economy. Lange proposed that central planners announce to industrial
managers prices for their inputs and outputs, and require the managers to report back with
the amounts of inputs they would demand, and outputs they would produce at those
prices, if they were to equate the prices to marginal costs (a necessary condition for
Pareto efficiency). The planners would then sum up, observe the discrepancies in the
supply and demand of each commodity, announce a second set of prices, raising those for
goods in excess demand and lowering those for goods in excess supply, and go through
the exercise again, hoping to eliminate the imbalances. Lange believed this process
7
would converge rapidly to an equilibrium; then the planners would post the equilibrium
prices and instruct firms to produce accordingly.
Lange also suggested that each household receive a certain fraction of the firms’
profits, perhaps allocated according to family size.
Lange did not deal properly with the demands of consumers. But assuming that
these could be incorporated into the scheme, what is the point of his kind of planning?
Why not simply let the market run autonomously? Lange has no convincing answer: he
did say that the central planning bureau (CPB) would be able to achieve equilibrium
much faster than the market, avoiding the disequilibrium phase that he considered to be
socially costly. (Today, this seems to be a quaint view, given the millions of
commodities that are produced in a complex economy. Indeed, economic theory still has
no full explanation of how the market ‘finds’ the equilibrium, and there are theorems that
the kind of ‘tâtonnement’ Lange proposed would, with high probability, not converge.)
Perhaps Lange thought that the CPB would control economic activity through setting
interest rates of various kinds, thus directing firms to invest in the directions the planners
desired.
Friedrich Hayek, however, offered a critique of another type. He wrote that it was
an illusion to believe that managers could respond with their input demands, facing prices
announced by planners, because they did not know their production functions, and
therefore could not compute marginal costs. Capitalist firm managers, he said, learn how
much they can produce with given inputs by the discipline of competition. It is the
competitive brawl that teaches managers how to cut costs and produce efficiently, and to
suppose that managers would know how to do so in the sterilized situation envisaged by
Lange was wrong. Indeed, how would the CPB deal with innovation, with new
commodities? The secret of real markets, Hayek argued, was that they provide incentives
and a mechanism for people (entrepreneurs) with local information about needs and
production possibilities to realize their ideas. Thus fixing the set of managers ex ante was
already dooming the system to conservatism and inefficiency.
It is interesting to note that Hayek never said that socialist managers would be
opportunistic or self-serving – that they would lie to the CPB in order to influence their
allotment of inputs. Hayek postulated that managers were ‘loyal and capable.’ This is in
8
sharp contrast to the critique of socialist management that emerged after 1970 among
western capitalist economists, when the principal-agent problem was formulated, and
‘shirking’ and opportunism became central issues.
Indeed, this raises a critical question about the failure of centrally-planned
socialism: was it due to lack of incentives or to lack of coordination? Markets perform
two functions: they provide incentives for workers and entrepreneurs to improve their
skills and discover new commodities so as to increase their income, but they also
coordinate economic activity. It may not be simple theoretically to distinguish precisely
these two functions, but they are clearly different. Matching of workers to firms, for
example, occurs in large part by observing wage offers; firms shop for inputs by
observing price offers. Of course the system does not work perfectly, but there is
doubtless a strong element of coordination engendered by a competitive price system.
(Price systems do not coordinate some things properly, such as control of externalities
and the supplies of public goods, and therein lies a major liberal justification of state
intervention.)
The history of the Soviet economy is replete with stories of poor incentives and
poor coordination: we do not have a complete account of the relative importance of these
two failures in the lackluster performance of centrally planned economies in their late
period. One also reads, however, of how hard Soviet workers worked, and how
ingenious they were at making do with poor inputs (see, for instance, Michael Burawoy).
I believe it is important to answer the question posed above, for upon it may rest the
possibility of a future for socialism.
Suppose markets are needed mainly to generate incentives to work hard, to form
skills, to invent, and so on. This implies that it will be difficult to use markets and to
redistribute income in a relatively equal manner, through taxation. After all, if workers
form skills in order to increase their incomes, but then their incomes are taxed away, why
form skills? On the other hand, suppose that markets are needed mainly to coordinate
economic activity: then in principle wage income (which would adjust competitively to
reflect marginal value products) could be taxed to produce an income distribution of
equality without harming production. In the second case, workers would form skills and
innovate because they enjoyed doing so, or felt valued for their social contributions.
9
I suspect the coordination problem is relatively more important in the failure of
centrally planned economies, and the incentive problem relatively less important, than
most currently believe. Many economists, especially, assume that the opportunist kind
of behavior so prevalent in the theory of homo oeconomicus is a deep aspect of human
nature, and therefore that it must have been rampant in the Soviet Union.
Markets are essential in any complex economy, at least for coordination, and
perhaps for incentives. But, as we have seen in the Nordic countries, tremendous
accomplishments with respect to income distribution can be achieved with taxation and
‘wage solidarity.’ One might say that the future of socialism lies in emulating the
Nordic social democracies. They may, however, not be easy to emulate, as the solidarity
of their citizenries may be due to their homogeneity – linguistic, religious, and ethnic.
Perhaps welfare states of that magnitude cannot be achieved in highly heterogeneous
societies.
A future for socialism may still, then, require an alternative to conventional
private ownership of firms with significant redistribution through taxation, because the
solidarity necessary for democratic approval of that degree of redistribution may not
evolve in large heterogeneous societies. If firms are not to be privately owned, as they
are in the Nordic model, then a central question concerns the way that accountability of
firm management is achieved. There is a principal-agent problem between the firm
manager (agent) and the shareholder-citizens (principal). How do the latter keep the
manager from running off with the profits and even the assets of the firm? The classical
solution is that firm ownership must be highly concentrated, so that there is a small
number of share holders who stand to gain huge amounts by carefully monitoring the
management. In this view, distributing shares of firms equally to all citizens would
destroy management accountability, resulting in unbridled corruption and inefficiency.
Recently a second theory has been proposed: that the guarantor of firm
accountability is the corporate raider. When the raider sees the price of a firm’s stock
fall, because the firm is not performing well (perhaps due to management corruption or
lack of imagination), he will buy a majority of shares and reorganize the firm to be
efficient, thus increasing its stock price, and providing him with a large capital gain.
10
Here, too, if credit markets are imperfect, we need wealthy individuals to keep firms
running well.
If these two mechanisms of accountability exhaust the possibilities, then market
economies in which firm profits are distributed in a relatively equal manner to citizens
are impossible. An apparent alternative, however, exists in Germany and Japan, where
firms are monitored by boards of directors consisting largely of officers of banks that
have a relationship to the firm. It is beyond my scope to describe this mechanism here:
suffice to say, it provides an alternative to relying upon hugely wealthy individuals for
guaranteeing firm accountability. If market socialism has a future, it may well be with
this kind of arrangement: firms will be monitored by bankers from the public sector,
whose reputations and careers depend upon doing a good job, or they may be monitored
by other stakeholders of the firm.
Another alternative (proposed by Roemer), with no present worldy examples, is a
system in which firm ownership is distributed to citizens in an initially equal way, but
ownership rights are circumscribed. An owner will collect dividends from the firms in
her portfolio, and even trade equity shares on a stock market, but she may not liquidate
her equity holdings for cash. This would be accomplished by denominating corporate
shares in a special unit of account. The values of shares, in that unit, would oscillate
according to supply and demand, reflecting traders’ views about the future profitability of
firms, as in a standard stock market. At death, a citizen’s portfolio would escheat to the
Treasury, and young adults, at the age of 21, would each receive their endowment of
shares. Some inequality in the values of share holdings would emerge as a consequence
of differential luck and skill in the stock market during a lifetime, but that equality would
not be passed on to descendents. In other words, this scheme is a method by which the
nation’s profit income could be distributed in a relatively equal manner to citizens, while
the virtues of a stock market, with respect to the valuation of shares, and the disciplining
of management, are retained.
There are surely possibilities for undermining the intentions of such a system. If
there are also individuals (such as foreigners) who are allowed to invest in these firms,
then possibilities arise for citizens to capitalize their holdings, to cash out their shares.
Old citizens will desire that firms in which they hold shares sell their assets and pay out
11
the entire value of the firm as dividends. Whether regulation could make the system
workable is an open question.
Finally, there is the possibility of state ownership of firms. We do not as yet have
a definitive experiment to test whether state ownership can work, for the Soviet–type
experiments also involved lack of democracy; it is logically possible that democratic
accountability could keep state-owned firms running efficiently. There are, however,
problems here as well: politicians, to whom state-owned firm managers ultimately report,
have their own interests that do not always coincide with those of the public. The
electoral mechanism is probably too crude a tool to force politicians to monitor firms in
the public interest. (Indeed, state-owned firms often pay their workers too much, to
garner their political support.) I conjecture that non-state ownership of firms will be
significant in any future socialist experiment.
We return finally to the relationship of socialism to equality. Do socialists believe
that an economy which implements ‘from each according to his ability, to each according
to his work,’ which by definition eliminates Marxian exploitation, is desirable? Most
socialists probably desire more equality than this, at least in societies where workers are
highly heterogeneous in skills. Thus, socialists have come to be, and perhaps always
were, more egalitarian than the Marxian definition would imply. Popular usage
suggests that socialism should be defined as a regime of income equality, a departure
from the Marxian tradition.
The proposals we have discussed above are all concerned with the allocation of
profit income. But is the allocation of profits so important with regard to equalizing the
distribution of income? In contemporary advanced economies, profits (including interest
and rents) comprise at most one quarter of national income; even if this part were
distributed in an egalitarian manner to all households, and remained of the same size, the
distribution of income would still, in most advanced countries, be quite unequal. Should,
then, the difference between socialism, popularly conceived, and capitalism lie mainly in
the distribution of wage income or of the role of redistributive taxation of labor income?
Rather than trying to define at what Gini coefficient a society becomes socialist,
one can be satisfied with ordering regimes in the world with respect to their degree of
socialism. The central instruments for socialist implementation then become, as well as
12
the redistribution of profit income, intensive investment in education, with a bias
towards rectifying the disadvantages children suffer due to being raised by poorly
educated parents, in order to equalize market–determined labor incomes, and
redistribution of labor income through taxation. The channel of intensive investment in
education of the disadvantaged is important because the provision of skills has value to
persons for reasons other than the instrumental one of providing income: education
renders life more meaningful and fruitful. But if the education conduit alone turns out
to be too costly, or too ineffective, to engender the changes in income distribution which
are desirable, then other methods must be used as well. The issue of feasible socialism,
therefore, will hinge upon the package of reforms that are effective, and can be realized
through democratic means.
How politically feasible is socialism, that is, to what degree can we expect
democracies to implement the reforms that move societies further along the socialist
scale? Here, the most hopeful historical evidence is provided by the Nordic and northern
European countries. Two problems seem to be paramount for the continuation of the
socialist trajectory in these economies: those of immigration and unemployment.
The welfare states of the northern European countries, as mentioned earlier,
evolved during the period when their populations were largely homogeneous, along
ethnic, linguistic, and religious dimensions. Homogeneity may be a necessary condition
for the democratic implementation of significant redistribution, if the welfare state is
motivated by either a purely redistributive or an insurance function. For, with respect to
the insurance function, it is not in the interest of highly educated and high-wage natives
in, let us say, Denmark, to pool their risks with poorly educated, low-wage immigrants.
And with respect to the purely redistributive function, ethnic, linguistic, and religious
heterogeneity reduce solidarity, to put it mildly, which must be the motivation of purely
redistributive taxation.
Unemployment is a problem not only for the deleterious welfare effects its
victims suffer, but because it is a severe form of economic inefficiency. If ‘socialist’
countries have high unemployment levels, and ‘capitalist’ countries low levels,
eventually the inefficiency of the former may well reduce per capita income significantly
below that of the latter, and populations of the socialist countries will begin to find the
13
higher incomes offered, on average, by the capitalist regimes, an attractive alternative.
If we assume that, in the coming century, the United States (and, let us say, China)
continue to offer low- unemployment, low- taxation, high-growth regimes, but with
relatively little redistribution, then democratic polities in Europe and the rest of the world
may be reluctant to move further on the socialist spectrum. This, of course, assumes
that there is some sacrifice in economic growth entailed by redistributive institutions, a
point that I have not defended here, but have taken for granted, and which may be
incorrect. Indeed, a growing literature asserts that equality increases productivity (see
Bardhan and Bowles).
It is perfectly natural for fertility rates to fall when social insurance replaces the
family as the source of income in old age: and smaller families, probably more than
anything, entail the liberation of women. (They are also, of course, an effect of that
liberation.) But European fertility rates now necessitate either a significant flow of
immigrants from poorer countries, or a sharp decline in per capita incomes in Europe for
retired workers, or an increase in the length of working life (which itself would
exacerbate the unemployment problem). So lower fertility renders the progress towards
socialism more complex at least, if not infeasible.
Consequently, the issue of multi-culturalism becomes a key intellectual problem
for socialists. What degree of integration or assimilation of immigrants is necessary for
democratic European polities to be willing and interested to continue and perhaps expand
their welfare states? (Recall, we refer here not simply to the redistributive motive, but to
the risk-bearing motive, of natives wishing to pool risks with immigrants.) We do not, I
think, yet know the answer. And will this degree of assimilation, whatever it turns out to
be, be acceptable to poor Southerners or Easterners who are contemplating migration to
the North or West?
Socialism, in the sense of equality of incomes, with a democratic implementation
requires either a self-interested insurance motive or a selfless solidaristic motive among
the majority of voter-citizens. We can hope that as national populations come to
experience more equality, they would come to have a deeper preference for it: socialists,
at least, believe that solidaristic preferences can intensify with the experience of equality,
because equality is a public good, a fact that will be appreciated when it is experienced.
14
(Indeed, we have not, in this article, discussed the negative externalities that socialists
believe accompany a regime with a highly concentrated ownership of private firms, in
which corporate and even state policy is set to further the interests of only the wealthiest
sliver of society. ) But the initial transitions along this path, taken by relatively selfcentered
voters, must come from the insurance motive. Here, then, is an important
problem for progress towards socialism in our time.
References
Bardhan, P. and S. Bowles, 2000. “Wealth inequality, wealth constraints and
economic performance,” in A. Atkinson and F. Bourguignon, eds., Handbook of Income
Distribution, Amsterdam: Elsevier Science Press
Burawoy, M. and J. Lukacs, 1985. “Mythologies of work: A comparison of firms
in state socialism and advanced capitalism,” American Sociological Review 50, 723-737
Hayek, F.A. 1940. “Socialist calculation: the competitive ‘solution’,” Economica
7, 125-149
Lange, O. 1956 [1936]. “On the economic theory of socialism,” in B. Lippincott,
ed., On the economic theory of socialism, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press
Luxemburg, R. 1972 [1913]. The accumulation of capital , New York: Monthly
Review Press
Ostroy, J. and L. Makowski, 1993. “General equilibrium and market socialism:
Clarifying the logic of competitive markets,” in P. Bardhan and J. Roemer, eds.,
MarketsSocialism: The current debate, New York: Oxford University Press
Roemer, J.E. 1994. A future for socialism, Cambrige, Mass. : Harvard University
Press
Roemer, J.E. and J. Silvestre, 1993. “The proportional solution for economies
with both private and public ownership,” Journal of economic theory 59, 426-444 |
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