[转帖]全球化的战略紧身衣
全球化的战略紧身衣
译自2004年2月11日电子刊物"耶鲁全球"
译者：兰守亭（南通）校者：田方萌（北京）
作者：本宁·加勒特（Banning Garrett） 首发于光明观察，转载请注明译者及出处；本译文仅供参考，引用请查对原文。 原编者按：不象在冷战时期，那时竞争只发生在美国和苏联之间，今天所有正在进行全球化的国家都成了竞争对手。然而，在大西洋理事会亚洲项目（Asia Programs at the Atlantic Council）的主任本宁·加勒特认为，在今天的全球化的经济中，这些竞争的国家也是伙伴，它们之间相互联系、相互依赖的关系日益加强。这些全球化的新形势扩大了每一个国家的优先事宜范围，使之超越了它们狭隘的民族利益，以避免这些国家在有利的国际体系中失去它们的位置。加勒特否定了现实主义者的观点，这种观点认为，假如让中国的力量日益壮大，中国同美国的关系将以权力斗争或可能的战争而告终。"在维护国际体制和保护他们与国际体制联系的纽带中，几乎所有的国家都感到自身具有当然的利害关系，中国也不例外，"他写到。对任何国家来说，打破目前全球化格局将会招致所有卷入其中的人们在经济和政治上的灾难。因而"全球化的进程为所有的全球化国家创造了一件战略上的紧身衣，包括唯一的超级大国美国在内。"加勒特说。 在相互依赖日益增强的条件下，国家利益被重新界定，冲突造成的花费之大使之必须得到抑制。 华盛顿：在苏联帝国灭亡之后，许多战略思想家开始寻找另一个在21世纪即将出现的，在力量上能与美国抗衡的潜在竞争对手。现在看起来这样的国家还没有出现。成功的全球化国家在经济和政治上不仅是竞争对手还是亲密的伙伴。依赖于通过世界全球化汲取力量的国家可能会发现使用武力更有害而不是更有用。 全球化的进程为全球化的国家制造了一件战略紧身衣，包括唯一的超级大国美国在内。在全球化的国家中用武力来取得战略上的优势或来解决争端是非常不可能的。像理查德·哈斯（Richard Haass）曾经指出的那样，在新的格局中，大国之间的战争几乎是难以想象的。显然欧盟国家穿着这件战略紧身衣，其它国家之间的关系也受其影响，包括美国和中国。 在美国，有一些人用现实主义者的观点去看待世界，他们认为像中国这样崛起的力量将不可避免地是一种威胁。他们辩解道：中国追求的是使它的军事力量与它飞速发展的经济力量相匹配，并且扩大它的防御范围，从而急剧削弱美国在亚洲军事和政治上的影响，重新制定国际规范和机构来促进它自己狭隘的国家利益。总之，对美国来说中国是一个长期的威胁，因此必须削弱它的力量并对它进行遏制。同样地，中国也有战略家认为美国将会为中国的快速发展设置障碍，并预言最后将会导致一场军事冲突。 然而，这些观点都没能看清国家力量和利益在全球化的形势下发生变化的基础。而且它不能说明中国的领导者是怎样看待他们国家长期民族利益和战略的。 除了同美国接触之外中国没有更好的选择。这个战略紧身衣可能越来越紧而不会越松，甚至在中国的经济增长力量看似扩大了它的选择余地和增强了它的军事潜力之时。中国领导者认识到，中国和外部世界经济关系的中断，伴随着政治上不稳定的后果，将会给中国的经济增长和现代化建设造成灾难性的影响。他们也认识到维护国际规范和机构的战略重要性，它们将促进全球经济的增长并有利于中国。他们认识到依靠领土占有和寻求对一个地区的军事霸权是不能加强中国的安全的--台湾对北京来说是国家统一问题，而不是占有领土的问题。随着中国越来越多地融入全球化经济和国际社会，中国依靠与美国的友好关系和维护美国领导的国际体制可能会继续加强。在维护国际体制和保护他们与国际体制联系纽带的过程中，几乎所有的国家都发觉了其中存在着明显的利害关系，中国也不例外。 现实主义者也低估了美国维持它世界上最强大国家地位的能力。发动一场自我击溃的战略挑战，从而取代美国成为世界领袖，这不符合包括中国在内的任何一个大国的利益。今天中国和其它大国的繁荣，常常还有安全，依赖于以美国为主导的国际经济秩序的健康发展。而且，与曾经激起苏美之间进行冷战的时代相比，目前不存在类似的意识形态、政治和经济体制上的斗争。然而，对美国来说，要维护它的繁荣、安定和在世界上的统治地位，也需要保持与其它大国的合作关系，特别是像中国这样在经济和战略上有其重要地位的大国。 全球化国家不仅缩小了他们相互针对的战略选择范围，而且他们也越来越容易受到来自经济衰败国家及流氓国家的威胁--那些国家通常最少参与全球化--一些非国家行动者（non-state actors）也会利用这些国家。他们带来的威胁包括在其领土上建造恐怖分子营地，像基地组织利用阿富汗，还包括跨国犯罪、地区冲突以及疾病的潜伏和传播。因此，全球化国家在战略上需要合作，从而在短期和长期内能够应对最少参与全球化国家所带来的挑战。 新的战略现实可以被理解为冷战期间世界两极力量的另一种表现形式，世界现在不是被分割为两个超级大国所控制下的区域，而是被分割为相对稳定的、有秩序的、繁荣的、相互联系和相互依赖的区域--也就是主要在欧亚大陆的大部分地区、亚洲的东北和东南部以及北美地区的所谓全球化国家--和相对不稳定的、无秩序的、经济衰退的、国家之间较少相互联系或相互依赖的地区，包括亚洲的东南部一部分、南亚和中亚、中东的大部分地区，撒哈拉以南非洲，以及加勒比海和拉丁美洲的部分地区。美国近15年来使用的武力指向展现了两极冲突的实例，这些武力绝对是用来对付经济衰败的流氓国家的。然而，新的形势依然是不明朗的。因为这些有分歧的地区仍旧充满变数，不能清楚地划清界限。 在2001年1月开始掌权时，这种新的混淆的两极格局对布什政府来说还不够明显。面对中国的崛起，美国上层官员着眼于维护美国的全球霸权和区域霸权。但是在9/11之后，布什政府班子重新调整了其战略优先事宜，重点打击全球的恐怖主义和衰退国家，而不是崛起国家，所带来的威胁。这导致了美国采取军事行动，在阿富汗推翻了塔利班政权，进而设法铲除基地恐怖主义分子的战略基地网络，它们的活动目标在于袭击美国本土。在阿富汗采取迅速成功的军事行动一年半之后，布什政府又自作主张发起了战争，以推翻萨达姆·侯赛因在伊拉克的政权。 然而，越来越可以证明，美国更善于推翻一个政权，而不是替换一个。在未来几年中，美国很有可能在阿富汗和伊拉克陷入冲突后的冲突（post-conflict conflicts），并且它将将需要来自盟友和各种国际机构的所有帮助。美国战略焦点一定会落在不稳定的非全球化国家上，正如总统国家安全战略咨文（President's National Security Strategy）中表明的那样。 这一新的战略图可能会确定21世纪所面临的挑战。成功进行全球化的国家是不是能够合作应对来自非全球化世界的威胁，并且帮助衰败国家成为成功的全球化国家，这一点仍然有待观察。应对来自非全球化国家带来的挑战，所汇聚的力量不仅包括美国、欧洲和日本，也应有中国。中国周边有许多非全球化的国家，它也容易受到它们威胁的攻击。中国的领导人认识该国在缓解这些威胁，加强巩固全球化秩序的制度和政权方面有着越来越重要的利益。而且，中美经济的相互依赖性正在迅速增长。中国需要美国的市场、技术和投资。中国所购买的超过1000亿美元的美国财政部国库券填补了美国的财政赤字，帮助维持了美国的低利率。由于衰败国家对美国和中国的安全和繁荣施加了共同威胁，华盛顿和北京需要长期进行合作，这也会在双边关系上大大地增强相互之间的信任和信心。为了将合作努力重新聚焦于21世纪真正的战略挑战，所有的主要国家应当利用这件团结全球化行动者的新的战略紧身衣。 本宁·加勒特是美国大西洋理事会亚洲项目主任。文章仅代表他自己的观点，这篇文章由他即将出版的论文《令人惊讶的战略？--21世纪初期的中美关系》改写而成。 附：原文及网址  http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=3311 Unlike during the Cold war, when competition was only between the US and the Soviet Union, today all globalizing nations are competitors. However, writes Banning Garrett, Director of Asia Programs at the Atlantic Council, these competing nations are also partners in today's globalizing economy, which is growing increasingly interconnected and interdependent. These new conditions of globalization widen each nation's priorities beyond narrow national interests lest they lose their place in the beneficial international system. Garrett rejects the Realist view that given the rising power of China, its relations with the US will end in a power struggle and possibly war. "Nearly all countries perceive a clear stake in maintaining the international system, and in protecting their own umbilical cord to that system; China is no exception," he writes. For any nation, breaking the current global arrangement would spell economic and political disaster for all involved. Thus "the process of globalization creates a strategic straitjacket for globalizing nations, including the sole superpower," says Garrett. - YaleGlobal The Strategic Straitjacket of Globalization Under conditions of growing interdependence, national interests are redefined and conflict made prohibitively costly Banning Garrett
YaleGlobal, 11 February 2004 WASHINGTON: After the demise of the Soviet empire, many strategic thinkers began to look for another potentially comparable competitor that would emerge to challenge the United States in the 21st century. It now appears likely that none will arise. Successfully globalizing states will be economic and political competitors and partners at the same time. These states, whose power depends upon enmeshment in the globalizing world, may find the use of force more harmful than helpful. The process of globalization creates a strategic straitjacket for globalizing nations, including the sole superpower. The use of force to gain strategic advantage or to settle disputes among globalizing states is highly unlikely. As Richard Haass has noted, war between the great powers is almost unthinkable within the new paradigm. While this strategic straitjacket is evident within the European Union, it also affects the relationships of other countries, including the US and China. There are those in the US who continue to view the world in Realist terms and maintain that a rising power such as China is inherently threatening. They argue that China will pursue military power to match its growing economic power and seek to expand its defense perimeter, sharply reduce US military and political influence in Asia, and redraw international norms and institutions to advance its own narrow national interests. China, in short, is a long-term threat to the United States that must be kept weak and contained. Similarly, there are strategists in China who think the US will seek to thwart a rising China and foresee an eventual military clash. Such views, however, fail to appreciate the changing basis of national power and national interests under conditions of globalization. Moreover, it fails to account for how Chinese leaders view the country's long-term national interests and strategy. China has no viable alternative to engagement with the United States. This strategic straitjacket is likely to tighten, not loosen, even though China's growing economic power would seemingly widen its options and enhance its military potential. Chinese leaders recognize that disruption of China's economic relations with the outside world would have a devastating impact on the country's economic growth and modernization, with politically destabilizing consequences. They also recognize the strategic importance of sustaining the international institutions and norms that have enhanced global economic growth and benefited China. They recognize that China's security is not enhanced by the occupation of land - Taiwan is a question of national unity to Beijing, not of acquiring territory - or seeking to militarily dominate a region. China's dependence on good relations with the United States and maintenance of the US-led international system will likely continue to grow as China becomes even more integrated into the global economy and international community. Nearly all countries perceive a clear stake in maintaining the international system, and in protecting their own umbilical cord to that system; China is no exception. The Realists also underestimate the US's ability to maintain its position as the world's most powerful nation. It will not be in any major nation's interest including China's to engage in a self-defeating strategic challenge to try to replace the US as the world leader. China and all the major powers today depend on the health of the US-led international economic system for their prosperity and often their security. Moreover, there is no battle of ideological, political and economic systems comparable to that which animated the Cold War competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. For the US to maintain its prosperity, security, and dominant position, however, it also needs to maintain cooperative relations with other major nations, especially an economically and strategically important one like China. Not only are the globalizing states limited in their strategic options toward each other, they are increasingly vulnerable to threats that emanate from weak, failing, and rogue states - usually the least globalized states - and non-state actors who utilize those states. These threats range from terrorist cells operating from their territory, like Al Qaeda used Afghanistan, to transnational crime, regional conflict, and incubation and spread of disease. Consequently, the globalizing states need to engage in strategic cooperation to meet the near and long-term challenges posed by the least-globalized states. This new strategic reality may be understood as another form of the bipolarity of global powers seen during the Cold War. The world is now divided not between two superpower-controlled blocs, but between the areas of relative stability, order, prosperity, interconnectedness, and interdependence - namely the globalizing states in much of Eurasia, Northeast and Southeast Asia, and North America - and the areas of relative instability, disorder, economic decline and little interconnectedness or interdependence including some areas of Southeast, South and Central Asia, much of the Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa, and parts of the Caribbean and Latin America. Evidence of this bipolar conflict is demonstrated by US use of force in the last fifteen years, which has been exclusively in and against weak, failing and rogue states. This new situation is inherently fuzzy, however, since these divergent areas shift constantly and are not clearly demarcated. This new fuzzy bipolarity was not evident to the Bush administration when it took power in January 2001. Top officials focused on maintaining US global and regional hegemony in the face of China's rise. But immediately after 9/11, the administration reordered its strategic priorities to focus on fighting global terrorism and the threats posed by declining rather than rising states. This led to US military action to topple the Taliban government in Afghanistan in an effort to deprive the Al Qaeda terrorist network of a strategic base for operations against the US homeland. The quick military success in Afghanistan was followed a year and a half later by the administration's discretionary war to remove Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq. The US has proven much more adept at regime removal than regime replacement, however. It now seems quite likely that the US will be bogged down in post-conflict conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq for years to come, and that it will need all the help it can get from allies and international institutions. The strategic focus of the US will necessarily be on unstable non-globalized states, as indicated in the President's National Security Strategy. This new strategic map is likely to define the challenges of the 21st century. It remains to be seen whether the successfully globalizing countries can cooperate to meet the threats from the non-globalized world and help failing and weak nations become successful globalizing ones. This pooling of power to meet the challenges emanating from non-globalized states needs to include not only the US, Europe, and Japan, but also China, which has many of these states on its periphery and is vulnerable to their dangers. Chinese leaders recognize that China has an increasing stake in mitigating these threats and strengthening the institutions and regimes that underpin the global order. Moreover, Sino-US economic interdependence is growing rapidly. China needs American markets, technology, and investment. China's purchase of more than $100 billion in US treasuries finances US deficits and helps keep interest rates low. The common threat to US and Chinese security and prosperity posed by failing states calls for long-term cooperation between Washington and Beijing, which could also dramatically strengthen mutual trust and confidence in the bilateral relationship. And all of the major powers need to take advantage of the new strategic straitjacket that unites globalizers in order to refocus their cooperative efforts on the real strategic challenges of the 21st Century. Banning Garrett is the Director of Asia Programs at the Atlantic Council of the United States. The views expressed are his own. This article is adapted from a paper to be published in "Strategic Surprise? - Sino-American Relations in the Early 21st Century," Edited by Jonathan Pollack (Newport, R.I. - Naval War College Press, February 2004) and is available online here. Rights:
2004 Yale Center for the Study of Globalization | 
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