[翻译]第31团战斗队的覆灭
长津战役的悲剧
Destruction of the 31st Infantry
A Tragedy of the Chosin Campaign
帕特里克 罗（美国海军陆战队退役少校） 著
Patrick C. Roe
Major, USMC (Ret) 第一部分 绪论
在1950年11月27日到12月6日十天之间长津战役中的那些至关紧要的战斗对战争未来的进程具有决定性的影响。一共打了四场不同的战斗：在下碣隅里的成功防御；在柳潭里的成功防御；陆战1师第5团和第7团从柳潭里到下碣隅里的成功突围；长津以东，第31团战斗队的战斗。在前三场战斗中，陆战1师成功的守住了阵地，随后完整地实施了撤退，因而在战斗结束时仍然是有效的战斗力量。这三场战斗中的每一场结束的时候，与海军陆战队交手的中国军队都遭到了重创。在长津湖东的战斗中，在那里的美国陆军部队作为一支战斗力量被基本歼灭了。但是，就在他们被歼灭的过程中，他们扼制住了一支规模相当大的中国军队，并对它造成严重伤亡，否则这支中国军队或许就能战胜下碣隅里的防御者。那个锁钥重地一旦失守，海军陆战队的撤退将更加艰难得多。
12月6日前，陆战1师着手从下碣隅里向南发动进攻的时候，艰苦的战斗并没有完全结束，但第10军的部队赢得了集中并保卫咸兴的宝贵时间。在4日，步3师在咸兴集合。次日，步7师的主力抵达。在此期间，与陆战1师的战斗、支援空军的打击和意料之外的严寒已严重地挫伤了中国军队的攻击力量。
因此当陆战1师完成向咸兴的成功退却时，第10军能够完整地从北朝鲜撤退，能够增援第8集团军并阻止中国人的攻势。当时准备的从朝鲜撤出所有美军部队的计划不再是必要的了。战争能够继续下去了。
第31团战斗队以骇人的代价为这一总体上的胜利做出了巨大贡献，这是不断恶化的后勤缺陷、战术错误、指挥失当和通信失灵造成的后果。这是朝鲜战争中重大的和不必要的悲剧之一。
然而，被包围并遭受严重伤亡的第31团战斗队，在关键的5天内牵制住了中共军队的两个师，为陆战队的成功撤退，乃至第10军从北朝鲜的成功撤退做出了贡献。
由于第31团战斗队近乎全军覆没，同时代的记录很少。几乎所有关于这些事件的信息都来自事后的官方报告和幸存者的个人回忆录。某些回忆录和陈述是很多年以后写成的，那时当事人的记忆已开始模糊了，尽管肯定要提到关于那些事件的回忆不可磨灭地铭刻在当事人的记忆之中。要做出任何重建事件发展的连贯景象的努力，就不得不解决这些障碍，也必然会面对对立的观点。由于缺少直接证据，要揭示历史真相就必须根据环境进行推理。在这项和其他研究中，我都做了上述工作，因为无论如何，遭到批评总是难免的。 第10军北进
如果战略决定战斗形势，那么导致第10军调转方向朝西进攻的考虑和行动就决定了长津湖战役的发展进程。
10月24日，正当第10军准备元山登陆的时候，麦克阿瑟将军命令在朝鲜的所有联合国军部队全速前进，完全调动全部兵力，确保对整个北朝鲜的占领。次日，在西线第8集团军的进攻正面和朝鲜东北部通往长津的公路上，联合国军都与中国人进行了最初的接触。截至11月6日为止，在朝鲜西部，中国人已将第8集团军赶回了清川江南岸。朝鲜东北部，步7师已经在利原登陆，而且在北进途中只遭遇到撤退中的北朝鲜部队偶尔的抵抗。在通向长津的公路上，陆战1师已超越南朝鲜部队，并在一场与中国人的激战之后，到达了黄草岭隘口的山脚下，陆战7团在此处遭遇到中国人的坚决抵抗，敌人据守着构筑良好的野战工事。
远东军司令部作战部长埃德温 K. 赖特将军深为忧虑。第10军在南北、东西间距超过160英里的区域内分散成多支小股部队。把该军这样展开，它就不可能占据有利位置，向第8集团军提供援助。该军自身的各部队间甚至也不可能相互支援。赖特将军的关切在华盛顿得到了响应。11月9日，国家安全委员会开会讨论中国已明显参战这一事件。在此次会议上，国防部长马歇尔注意到了第10军的分散状态并就此提出质疑。布莱德雷将军相信麦克阿瑟这样部署是为了实现他占领整个朝鲜的决定并确保选举的开展。布莱德雷的声明是一条线索，揭示出麦克阿瑟和布莱德雷可能对麦克阿瑟的命令的确切含义都存有一些误解。
尽管中国军队出其不意地出现，第10军军长爱德华 M. “奈德”阿尔蒙德将军仍致力于全速推进，占领该军进攻地带内的所有北朝鲜领土。稍后，在11月7日，中国军队朝鲜的两边都突然而神秘地后撤了。在西线，第8集团军进入出发阵地，准备一旦补给完毕就恢复进攻。在朝鲜东北部，陆战1师第7团占领了黄草岭，并在11月10日抵达了古土里。这样，在第10军左翼的海军陆战队和距离最近的第8集团军部队间就出现了一条巨大的裂缝。于是，11月10日阿尔蒙德将军就被提醒任务有可能改变。赖特将军在致第10军军长的私人信函中传达了麦克阿瑟将军的命令，该命令要求阿尔蒙德了解第8集团军的计划以便应对形势的任何改变。他建议第10军的计划要根据协同第8集团军恢复进攻这一主要目标进行修改。此时，第8集团军的进攻预定在11月15日开始。 筹划向西进攻
中国人的撤退使阿尔蒙德将军打消了疑虑，他发布了第6号作战命令，重新开始进攻。规定第10军的任务为：“歼灭进攻地带内的敌军，挺进到朝鲜的北部边界。”陆战1师、步7师和南朝鲜第1师都接到了前进和歼灭进攻地带内的敌军的命令。陆战1师进攻地带的界限距该师的直线距离超过85英里，（公路上的路程可能要翻一番），其中要穿过最难以通行和多山的地形。（阿尔蒙德将军）没有给任何一个师规定中继目标。按照通常的军事惯例，这意味着每支部队要不顾翼侧部队的进展向前突进。对于麦克阿瑟将军要求第10军准备援助第8集团军的信件，作为一项明显的让步，阿尔蒙德指示刚抵达的步3师和陆战1师遵照命令准备向西进攻。
阿尔蒙德将军对将第10军向西旋转的前景并不满意。14日，他在给赖特将军的回信中概述了对将第10军转向西方的计划的异议。阿尔蒙德说：一旦需要，第10军能够转向西方。但看起来中国人的攻势已被第8集团军完全牵制。第10军最好通过继续北进支援第8集团军，这直接有助于“尽快尽可能地占领整个北朝鲜”的总体目标。第10军一旦进至更北的地区，便可通过威胁中国人的补给线的方式援助第8集团军。
阿尔蒙德的信中也包含了微妙的暗示：与他冲向鸭绿江的计划的积极效果相比，第8集团军恢复进攻的计划是有限和胆怯的。中国人参战已在所有重要方面改变了局势，他的信中奇怪地缺乏对这一点的认识。
赖特并不满意。他让他的合同战略计划和作战组研究了战局，了解第10军能以目前计划外的何种方式援助第8集团军。合同战略计划和作战组相信根据集中兵力和针对性的战术原则，实施这一行动的唯一途径是向西北方向发动进攻，威胁对阵第8集团军的敌军的侧背并迫使其撤退。通过停止第10军的前进并将其向西掉转方向，有两个师可供动用。因为这场进攻是可能沿狭窄正面展开的道路争夺战，为协同攻击而集中部队将不再是必要的了。这场进攻将以已进入阵地的部队发动。
作为此项研究的结果，麦克阿瑟在11月15日指示第10军，“作为你军第6号作战命令的预案，计划将进攻方向转向西面，抵达长津附近，切断敌军的主补给线…预案将按照联合国军司令部的命令执行。向司令部提交计划和所有相关的建议。”
赖特并非唯一关心第10军部署的人。24日，当陆战1师的开路先锋陆战7团到达下碣隅里的时候，师长O. P.史密斯将军极为关注该师暴露的左翼。史密斯将军坦率地向因视察和联络的公务来朝鲜短期旅行的远东海军司令莫尔豪斯海军上将陈述了他的关切。史密斯也向海军陆战队司令写了信，声明他感觉阿尔蒙德的命令是错误的。史密斯声称他将不再逼迫部队冒覆灭的风险轻率前进：“我们是该军最左翼的师，而且我们的左翼的宽广地段是暴露的。没有任何一支第8集团军的部队位于我师西南方80英里以内。”第10军本应“在适当的时机”向他保证在他的翼侧没有中国军队，“如果这项情报属实，那就没有什么能阻止第8集团军与我们齐头并进。他们没有这样做…尽管中国人撤往北方，但我仍未催促利曾伯格快速推进。将一个陆战队师孤悬在从咸兴到鸭绿江直线距离120英里的一条山间公路上，我对这种部署的前途并不乐观。目前，我在这条公路上拥有两个团级战斗队的兵力，当普勒被步3师接替时，我将让他从后方向师主力靠拢。”
阿尔蒙德服从了总司令的命令，他让自己的参谋部拟定了作战计划——草案1。按照这个草案，第10军将从长津急进，攻占江界。阿尔蒙德否决了该草案。如果推进到那么远，主补给线将会变得过长。他要求以陆战1师沿下碣隅里——武坪里轴线推进为基础拟定一个新方案。步7师的一个团级战斗队将向北进攻，攻克长津后继续向鸭绿江挺进。咸兴——下碣隅里线将发展为该军的主补给线。最后，该方案是在考虑到严重妨碍敌我双方作战的华氏零下30到40度的极低温度的情况下拟定的。
就在第10军拟定方案的过程中，赖特将军并未被阿尔蒙德的信件说服，他继续自己另外的谋划。17日，他提出了一份冗长的备忘录，阐述了第10军可选择的一种部署，他认为该部署可以更有效地支援第8集团军的进攻，这是执行它所能达成的主要成就。赖特担忧敌军可能会从中部山脉地区冲出，包围第8集团军的右翼或第10军的左翼。为预防这种可能，他想要重新集合第10军以保卫兴南地区，并在元山地区配置一个师以上的兵力，做向西或西北方向进攻的准备。他指出，中国人正在向东调动部队、进入德川、宁远地区，并从长津向同一地区转移兵力，该地区是第8集团军战线上最薄弱的地段。中国人可从此处向东、西两面中的任何一面发动进攻。
赖特指出步7师的进展很小。敌军在该师正面的兵力甚少，惠山——普天一线以东或甲山以北地区缺乏战略价值。他的计划是重新部署第10 军的部队：步3师掩护元山——高原地段，取消步7师向北挺进的计划，并将其插入高原以北至小白山脉的地段，小白山脉位于柳潭里西南10英里。陆战1师将在第10军的正面展开，以掩护从小白山脉开始、横越长津水库和赴战水库、到丰山西南10英里的Hwangsuwon-ni附近的地段。 威洛比将军赞同此项建议。他同意：步7师在其进攻地带内所遭遇的微弱抵抗将在短期内终结。威洛比认为敌军的主要兵力集结在熙川地区。尽管经过该地区的公路网很贫乏，但敌军已证明了他们在艰难地形上的机动能力，他们确实未被束缚在公路上并且已意识到了位于第8集团军翼侧的南朝鲜军的弱点。他们拥有向东南方向发动进攻或侧击第8集团军的能力。
在接下来的一周内，赖特的方案和阿尔蒙德的方案为争夺麦克阿瑟将军的批准展开了竞争。
很可能，当时讨论了三个方案：赖特的方案，第10军的第8号作战方案，以及阿尔蒙德陈述过的优先选择——继续向北进攻。阿尔蒙德和他的全体参谋人员都不希望改变进攻方向去翻山越岭。如阿尔蒙德的参谋长拉夫纳将军抨击道：“通过长津湖向西进攻与第8集团军会合的决定是在东京总司令部做出的。这是一个非常愚蠢的方案。你不可能像在和平时期吃野餐一样（轻松地）到达那里，而且在11月和12月要翻越那种地形是不可能的。”
也有难以处理的人事方面的考虑。由于阿尔蒙德做麦克阿瑟的参谋长时专横跋扈地对待沃克将军，他在自己和沃克之间制造了颇深的宿怨。到此时，第10军实际上已经是5个师组成的野战集团军，只差命名了。（赖特)提议的向西进攻最终会使第10军加入第8集团军。阿尔蒙德并不想放弃自己与集团军司令旗鼓相当的地位，听候他先前得罪过的那个人的差遣。
就在战术上的争论吵得不可开交的时候，阿尔蒙德继续命令第10军向前推进。截至20日，陆战7团已抵达下碣隅里和柳潭里之间的德洞山口。在更东面，第31步兵团已经在赴战湖附近无路可通的冰天雪地中展开了巡逻。11月8日及15日，该团的部队遭遇到中国人并与其营级规模部队交战。在这两次战斗中，中国人都没有奋勇作战。第31步兵团团长艾伦 D. 麦克里恩上校，该团3营长威廉 R. 雷利中校，及第31步兵团其余人员逐渐对中国人的战斗力嗤之以鼻，这种态度会在将来给他们带来麻烦。在更东的地段上，截至11月20日，第17步兵团已经占领了甲山并到达了距鸭绿江仅几英里的惠山镇。次日，伴随着阿尔蒙德将军和步7师师长大卫 G. 巴尔[巴大维]将军的“飞行纵队”抵达惠山镇。指挥官们列队拍摄了纪念照，然后仪式性地向江中小便，对岸的中国人好奇地注视着他们。
阿尔蒙德兴高采烈地取得了这项成就之后，打算将步7师推进到朝鲜的极北端，这是威洛比将军所认为的只能取得极小收获的地带。阿尔蒙德将步7师的其余部队向第17步兵团后方调动，命令其集中于甲山——丰山地区。
第32步兵团随后在三湖——北青附近、五老里东北的峡谷地区集结，他们给该地区起的绰号是“欢乐谷”。该团将在第17步兵团的左翼展开，从三湖向Singalpojin进攻。团长波查普上校试图沿通往东北方公路的移动该团，但发现隘路被积雪阻塞了。不得不原路返回，走经过咸兴的那条路程较长的路。一次只能开动1个营的卡车。因此，波查普在几天里一直忙于挪动他的两个营、团部和团直属队。
第10军的第17号作战指令指示陆战1师在进攻地带内迅速推进，在柳潭里、德实里和Tuan Daae建立阻滞阵地。步7师奉命沿鸭绿江向三水、Yongpyong-dong, Wondong-ni和Singalpojin挺进。当（东京总司令部）做出改变进攻方向的决定的时候，所有第10军的部队都已经为执行第17号作战指令而处于运动中了。 Part I – Introduction
The crucial battles of the Chosin Campaign, which had a decisive impact on the future course of the war, were fought in the ten day period between November 27 and December 6 , 1950. Four different actions were fought; the successful defense of Hagaru; the successful defense of Yudam-ni; the successful effort of the 5th and 7th Marines to break through from Yudam-ni to Hagaru-ri; the fight of RCT 31, East of Chosin. In the first three of these battles elements of the 1st Marine Division were successful in holding their position, and then withdrawing intact so that at the conclusion of the action they remained effective fighting forces. At the conclusion of each of these three actions the opposing Chinese forces were badly damaged. In the battle East of Chosin the army forces there were essentially destroyed as an effective fighting force. But, in the course of their destruction they held in check and inflicted significant damage to a sizeable Chinese forces which might otherwise have overcome the defenders of Hagaru-ri. Loss of that key location would have made the withdrawal of the Marines vastly more difficult.
By December 6th, when the 1st Marine Division commenced its attack south from Hagaru-ri, all of the hard fighting was not over but precious time had been gained for scattered X Corps forces to concentrate and secure Hamhung. The 3rd Infantry Division had assembled at Hamhung on the 4th . The following day the bulk of the 7th Infantry Division arrived. During that period, the attacking Chinese forces had been severely mauled by the fighting with the 1st Marine Division, by the attacks of supporting air, and by the unexpectedly severe weather.
As a result when the 1st Marine Division completed it successful withdrawal to Hamhung X Corps was able to withdraw from North Korea,intact, able to reinforce the Eighth Army and halt the Chinese offensive. The plans then in preparation for withdrawal of all U. S. forces from Korea were not necessary. The war could continue.
The significant contribution of RCT31 to this overall success was made at a terrible cost, the result of an escalating succession of logistical, tactical, command and communication failures. It was one the great, and unnecessary, tragedies of the Korean War.
Nevertheless, RCT 31, surrounded and suffering heavy casualties, for five crucial days kept two CCF divisions engaged, contributing to the successful withdrawal of the Marines and, ultimately, to the successful withdrawal of X Corps from North Korea.
Because of the almost complete destruction of RCT31 there are few contemporaneous records. Nearly all information on the events there come from after-the-fact official reports and personal recollections of those who survived. Some of those personal recollections and statements were written many years later when memories have faded, although it must be said that recollection of those events was indelibly engraved on the memories of those who were there. Any attempt to recreate a coherent picture of events has to deal with these obstacles, and with strongly opposing viewpoints. In the absence of direct evidence of some events historical candor requires inference from the circumstances. In this and in other studies I have done that for whatever criticism may be warranted. X Corps Moves North
If strategy sets the conditions under which battles are fought then the deliberations and actions leading to the decision to reorient X Corps attack to the west to assist Eighth Army set the stage for the Chosin battles.
On 24 Oct just as X Corps was preparing to land at Wonsan, General MacArthur ordered all UNC forces in Korea to drive forward with all speed, and with the full utilization of all their force, to secure all of North Korea. The following day UNC forces made initial contact with the Chinese both in the the Eighth Army sector in the west and in the northeast on the road to Chosin. By the 6th of November, the Chinese, in western Korea, had driven the Eighth Army back to the Chongchon River.
In northeast Korea the 7th Infantry Division had begun landing at Iwon and moving north meeting only occasional resistance from retreating North Korean units. On the road to Chosin the 1st Marine Division had passed through ROK units and, after a fierce fight with the Chinese, had advanced to the foot of the Funchillin Pass where the 7th Marines faced determined Chinese resistance occupying well constructed field fortifications.
General Edwin K.Wright, Far Eastern Command G-3, worried. X Corps was scattered in small units spread over 160 miles from south to north and nearly the same distance west to east. Deployed as it was the corps was in no position to lend support to the Eighth Army. It was not even able to provide mutual support to its own units.
General Wright's concern was echoed in Washington. The National Security Council had met November 9th to discuss China's apparent entry into the war. At that meeting Defense Secretary Marshall noted the dispersion of X Corps and questioned it. General Bradley believed this disposition had been made by MacArthur in order to carry out his directive to occupy the entire country and hold elections1. Bradley's statement was a clue there might be some misunderstanding, both by MacArthur and Bradley, of just what MacArthur's instructions were.
Despite the unexpected appearance of Chinese forces General Eward M. “Ned” Almond, X Corps commander, was intent on pushing ahead to occupy all of North Korea in his zone. Then, on the 7th of November, Chinese forces, on both sides of Korea, suddenly and mysteriously withdrew. In the west Eighth Army units moved forward to positions ready to renew their offensive as soon as supplies could be built up. In the northeast the 7th Marines of the 1st Marine Division secured the Funchillin Pass and reached Koto-ri by November 10th . This opened a huge gap between the Marines, on the left flank of X Corps, and the nearest Eighth Army units. So, on 10 November General Almond was alerted to a possible change of mission. In a personal letter to the X Corps Commander General Wright relayed General MacArthur’s instructions for Almond to become familiar with Eighth Army plans in order to be prepared for any possible change in the situation. He suggested that X Corps plans be developed for a strong effort in coordination with resumption of the Eighth Army offensive, which, at that time, was anticipated to commence on November 15th. Planning for the Attack West Reassured by the Chinese withdrawal General Almond issued his Operation Order No. 6 on November 11th to resume the advance. The order stated the X Corps mission: "Destroy enemy in zone and advance to the Northern Border of Korea." The 1st Marine Division , 7th Infantry Division and I ROK Corps were all ordered to advance and "destroy enemy in zone." The border in the 1st Marine Division's zone was more than 85 airline miles away (perhaps double that by road) through some of the most difficult and mountainous terrain in Korea. No intermediate objectives were given either division. In the ordinary military usage this meant that each unit was to advance without regard to the progress of units on either flank. It was an order for all out exploitation. As an apparent concession to the General MacArthur’s letter to be prepared to assist the Eighth Army, both the 3rd Infantry Division, just arriving, and the 1st Marine Division, were directed to be prepared for offensive operations to the west on order.4 General Almond was not pleased with the prospect of the turning west. On the 14th he replied to Wright‘s letter outlining his objections to the plan to turn west. X Corps, Almond said, was capable of turning west if needed. But it appeared that the Chinese offensive had been contained by the Eighth Army. X Corps could best support Eighth Army by continuing north which would also directly contribute to the overall objective of “securing all of North Korea... as expeditiously as possible.” Once farther north X Corps could then assist Eighth Army by threatening Chinese supply lines.
Almond‘s letter also contained a subtle suggestion that Eighth Army’s plan for resuming the offensive was limited and timid in contrast to the energetic execution of his plan to drive for the border. Strangely absent is any recognition that the entry of the Chinese has changed the situation in any significant way.
Wright was not satisfied. He had his Joint Strategic Plans and Operations Group study the situation to see what assistance X Corps might offer to Eighth Army in place of that already planned by X Corps. JSPOG believed that with sound adherence to the principles of concentration and objective the only course of action was to mount an attack to the northwest which would threaten the rear of the enemy confronting the Eighth Army and cause him to withdraw. By halting the forward movement of X Corps and reorienting toward the west two divisions could be made available. Since the attack would probably be along a narrow front as a fight for the route of advance, concentration of forces for a coordinated attack would not be necessary. The attack could be launched with forces already in position.
As a result of this study MacArthur directed X Corps on 15 November, to "...develop, as an alternate feature of your Operation Order No. 6, plans for reorienting attack to westward upon reaching the vicinity Changjin in order to cut enemy MSR...Alternate operation would be executed on order CINCUNC. Submit plans and any pertinent recommendations this headquarters."6
While this was going on General Wright was not convinced by the Almond's letter of the 14th. He proceeded to do some additional planning of his own. On the 17th he produced a lengthy memorandum for the chief of staff (acting) setting forth an alternative disposition for X Corps which would, he believed, more effectively support the Eighth Army offensive, which was to be the main effort. Wright was worried an enemy force could drive down through the central mountain area and execute an envelopment of the right flank of Eighth Army or the left flank of X Corps. To counter this possibility he wanted to re-group X Corps to secure the Hungnam area and establish a division or more in the Wonsan area prepared to attack west or northwest. He pointed out that the Chinese were shifting forces eastward in the central area around Tokchon and Yongwon, and sideslipping forces westward from Chosin to the same area, the weakest part of the Eighth Amry line. The Chinese could strike from there in either direction.
Wright pointed out that the 7th Division's advance was accomplishing little. There was little enemy strength in front of the divisions and there was little of strategic importance to be gained east of the line Hyesan-jin - Pukchong, or north of Kapsan.9 His plan was to re-deploy X Corps with the 3rd Infantry Division covering the sector from Wonsan to Kowon. The 7th Infantry Division would break off its northward advance and be inserted in the sector from Kowon north to Soebak-san, a mountain about ten miles southwest of Yudam-ni. The 1st Marine Division would then be extended to cover a frontage stretching from Soebak-San across the Chosin and Fusen Reservoirs to the vicinity of Hwangsuwon-ni, about ten miles southwest of Pungsan.10
General Willoughby concurred in this recommendation. He agreed that with the meager resistance the 7th Division had encountered there was little to be accomplished in that zone. Willoughby thought the main enemy strength was assembling in the Huichon area. Although the road net leading from there was poor they had demonstrated their capability for movement over difficult terrain, were certainly not road-bound, and were aware of the ROK weakness on the flank of Eighth Army. They had the ability to launch an attack to the southeast, or a flanking attack on the Eighth Army.
In the next week the Wright plan and the Almond plan competed for General MacArthur's approval.
Very probably three plans were under discussion, the Wright Plan, X Corps Operation Plan 8, and General Almond's stated preference for continuing the attack to the north. Neither Almond nor the members of his staff wanted to change direction and attempt to cross the mountains. As General Ruffner, his chief of staff, put it, "The decision for X Corps to attack through the Chosin Reservoir westward to hook up with Eighth Army was made at GHQ -Tokyo. It was an insane plan. You couldn't take a picnic lunch in peacetime and go over that terrain in November and December." 11
There was an additional touchy personality consideration. As a result of his sometimes highhanded treatment while acting as MacArthur's chief of staff, Almond had created considerable animosity between himself and Walker. By now X Corps was in all but name a five Division field army. The proposed attack west would ultimately join X Corps and Eighth Army. Almond did not relish the idea of having to give up his co-equal status and serve under the man he had previously antagonized.
While this tactical debate simmered Almond continued to push forward. By the 20th the 7th Marines had reached Toktong Pass between Hagaru and Yudam-ni. Farther east the 31st Infantry had been patrolling in the roadless and frozen area around the Fusen Reservoir area. On 8 November and again on the 15th units of the regiment had encountered Chinese and engaged them in up to battalion strength. In neither case did the Chinese put up a spirited fight. Colonel Allan D. MacLean, commander of the 31st Infantry, LtCol William R. Reilly, his 3rd Battalion commander, and others in the 31st Infantry, came to view the Chinese fighting ability with contempt, an attitude which contributed to future problems.12 Still farther to the east, by the 20th of November, the 17th Infantry had secured Kapsan and reached a point just a few miles short of the Yalu River at Hyesan-jin. The following day, , a "flying column" accompanied by General Almond and General David G. Barr, the 7th Division’s commander, entered Hyesan-jin. The commanders lined up for congratulatory photographs, then ritually urinated in the river while curious Chinese on the other side looked on.
Elated with this accomplishment Almond planned to push the 7th Division ahead in the very zone where General Willoughby thought little could be accomplished. Almond ordered the remainder of the 7th Infantry Division to be brought up behind the 17th Infantry and concentrated in the Kapsan - Pungsan area.
The 32nd Infantry, then assembled in the area around Sinhung - Pokchong in the valley northeast of Oro-ri, an area they nicknamed "Happy Valley, was to deploy on the left of the 17th Infantry and attack through Samsu to Singalpojin. The regimental commander, Colonel Charles E. Beauchamp, attempted to move his regiment over the road to the northeast but found the pass blocked by snow.
Movement had to backtrack and go the long way around through Hamhung. Trucks were available for only one battalion at a time. Thus Beauchamp was several days in getting two of his battalions and his headquarters and regimental troops moved.
Corps Operation Instruction No. 17, issued 22 November, directed the 1st Marine Division to advance rapidly in zone and to establish blocking positions at Yudam-ni, Toksil-li and Tuan Daae.
The 7th Infantry Division was ordered to advance to Samsu, Yongpyong-dong, Wondong-ni and Singalpojin on the Yalu. All corps forces were moving to carry out this plan when the decision was made to change X Corps direction of advance.
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